COMMENT UPON SOME RECENT NEW JERSEY
CASES ON CORPORATE CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE AND TO PREVENT
COMPETITION.
Political divisions of states and the territorial limits of
mercantile intercourse have seldom been coextensive.
Buyer and seller have always sought each other according
to their respective needs regardless of national lines. Commerce has followed natural routes, the easiest course to get
the article from producer to consumer. Territorial limits
of nations are increasingly disregarded by lines of trade, and
those restrictive barriers imposed by governments have
often proved ineffective or disastrous. More insistent
grows the demand that politics shall not retard business.
They must not conflict. Colonize and acquire by conquest, if you please-as yet that is allowed to remain only
an affair between the mighty and the weak-but the open
door of trade must be maintained. With the modem facilities of communication and transportation there are no
territorial bounds set. From everywhere may orders be
solicited and received; to any place within the four corners
of the earth may goods, wares and merchandise be delivered. With the expansion of territorial lines has come a
change in the manner of conducting business. When producer and consumer lived in the same city, village or shire,
and the means of transportation were crude, labor was
limited and cheap, and the capital invested was small
and the risk slight. There was little need of association*,
for few enterprises were great enough to require it, and
a partnership was found effective enough when individual initiative became unequal to the task of coping with
ever-expanding mercantile enterprise. But the day of
the individual business man or group of men as partners, carrying on an interstate business, is past. Progression has been from the individual, through the partnership and the comparatively modem corporation to
the up-to-date combination or trust, "that many-headed,
monster thing." While the rights of natural persons in
672
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business were long since ascertained under the English
system, and the law of partnerships formed by such
natural persons by their own act and without state aid has
been more or less fixed and stable for many years, the law
of corporations which come into being only by express
permission and grant from the sovereign is, in these United
States, being made and unmade by legislatures and interpreted and declared by the courts from day to day. In
England, corporate franchises are acquired from the state,
but here, whilst the federal government does not produce
such offspring, the number of sovereignties within its jurisdiction which have such productive capacities is only limited by the number of states. Citizens of the United States
must, no matter how extensively the contemplated enterprise is about to be conducted, apply to some state for a
corporate franchise. In the absence of necessity, economy
discourages incorporation in every state in which business
may be done, nor by such means can a company obtain
identical existence from each state, but by interstate comity a company created by one state is allowed to carry on
business in and across others. As corporations are thus
exclusively the creatures of state law, the grant of franchise can only be revoked by the proper tribunal in the
state of origin under rules and procedure established by
it. The authority of other state jurisdictions and of the
federal government over a state corporation is restrictive
and even prohibitive, within certain limits, but does not go
to the dissolution of the corporation itself. It is therefore
essential to consider companies engaged in interstate.commerce from two points of view, first with what powers and
under what duties and obligations such companies come
into being in the state of origin, and next to ascertain the
restriction and prohibitions which other states, in which
such companies do business, and the federal government,
impose upon the exercise of such powers.
New Jersey is the leading state in the number and importance of incorporated companies. No other state, and
indeed no nation, has given corporate existence to such an
immense business concern as the United States Steel Company, whose financial transactions approach in size those of
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the national government; or the Northern Securities Company, incorporated to manage, through ownership of
stock, two competing railway companies, neither of which
,have a single tie or rail in the state of origin, but whose
lines extend thousands of miles in other states.
One of the most important questions at present pending
is what rights have such corporations in acquiring' and
holding and exercising ownership over shares of stock in
other corporations, and especially in corporations which
were theretofore rivals in business? In view of the decision
just announced by the United States Circuit Court in the
Northern Securities case, it is of interest, before discussing
the effect of that decision, and the likelihood of its affirmance or reversal by the United States Supreme Court, to
examine the power and obligations of such a company
under the law of the state which gave it birth.
It is proposed to here discuss some recent decisions of
the New Jersey courts declaring the law affecting corporations, in cases in which the aid of the court was invoked to
enforce or to enjoin contracts in restraint of trade and
those tending to monopoly or to prevent competition.
Natural persons are at liberty to do any act, subject to
rights surrendered to government for the good of society.
A corporation can only conduct its affairs to carry out the
object of incorporation, under powers granted by the state
and as expressed in the charter or implied by law. It has
no natural rights. It is the creature of legislation.- Under
compulsion its must find authority in legislative grant for
,every function it seeks to exercise.
The general corporation act of New Jersey provides incorporation for any object or objects, to carry on any lawful business whatever, with certain exceptions; it confers
certain defined powers upon all companies, and in addition
those selected and specified in each particular certificate of
incorporation, which are by implication accompanied by
all others necessary and convenient to the ones so selected
and appropriate to the business of the company. Any
company may purchase, own and dispose of stock and
bonds of other companies, domestic or foreign, and exervise all rights of ownership over them, including the right

NEW JERSEY CASES ON CORPORATE CONTRACTS.

675

to vote such stock. It may of course acquire, own, use and
dispose of property and rights in any way useful and desirable to its business. It may, so far as any limitation appears in the enabling act, acquire control of all competing
businesses, if its coin will stretch so far. Merging in a company created for the purpose, or combining, by companies
engaged in similar business, is contemplated by a supplement to the act, and the terms under which such merger
may take place are set out in detail; even a dissenting minority stockholder cannot prevent such merger, for (if the
supplement act is constitutional, -and it has not yet been
questioned) the company may sell his shares, and compel
him by order of court to transfer them to the company,
in aid of such sale, and so be rid of him.
The powers of a company incorporated under this act,
touching the right of the company to hold stock in rival
concerns, and to contract to restrain trade and prevent
competition, were well analyzed by Vice-Chancellor Green

in Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Railway, etc., Co.1 A bill

was filed by stockholder seeking to enjoin the carrying
out of a contract executed by the defendant company
named, with three stockyard companies and two rival landholding and railway companies. The contract, among
other things, provided a settlement of suits between some
of the parties, a purchase and holding of stock, by the
Junction Company, of the two land-owning railway corn,
panies, and contained covenants that the stockyard companies would not, so long as the Transit Company (whose
stock was owned by the Junction Company) conducted its
business on its premises in Chicago, carry on- there the
business of stockyards for the general use of the public;
and further, that for fifteen years they would not carry
on the business of stockyards in or within two hundred
miles of Chicago. The contract was criticised as not being within the chartered powers of the company in that
it provided for purchase and ownership of stock and property of other companies, and for settlement of suits, and
that some of the covenants were for non-competition
and in restraint of trade. Passing briefly on the atti'49 N. J. Eq. 217, 1891.
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tude of the complainant stockholder before the court as
of one whose property investment might be damaged by
corporate acts of directors and who might therefore be
entitled to relief, if such acts were found to be ultra vires or
otherwise unlawful, the vice-chancellor found that the
general act gives to all corporations organized under it
general corporate powers and all others necessary to
their exercise, the certificate of incorporation being the
charter of the company and equivalent to a special act
of the legislature; that a corporation so organized was
vested with the powers conferred by the general act, and
contemplated by the certificate, and such incidental powers
as we-e convenient, reasonable and proper to carry out the
general purposes of the company's creation; but such a
company was not empowered to do those things which
would deprive it of ability to carry out the objects for
which it was formed, or to discharge any duties which it
might, under its charter, owe to the public, or which were
contrary to the policy of the law. The language of Lord
Chancellor Selbourne was quoted with approval, that the
doctrine of ultra vires should be reasonably applied, and
what might be fairly regarded as incidental to and consequential upon the things which were authorized by the
charter ought not, unless expressly prohibited, to be held
by judicial construction to be ultra vires. The certificate
of the Junction Company expressly authorizing it to buy,
hold, exercise ownership over and dispose of securities of
persons and corporations, the contract was held to be not
illegal in this regard; the covenants for compromise of suits
and non-competition were thought .not referable to any
specification in the charter, but the power to make such
agreements was incident to corporate management and
business and was approved. Criticism of the covenants as
being in restraint of trade was discussed. Mr. Freeman's
formulation of the rule was approved, that "contracts
which impose an unreasonable restraint upon the exercise
of a business were void, but those in reasonable restraint
were valid," and that validity of restrictions was to be governed by their reasonableness at the time of making the
contract. It was held restrictions in question were reason-

NEW JERSEY CASES ON CORPORATE CONTRACTS.

677

able in time and territory, were necessary to afford fair protection to the interests of the party in whose favor they
were given, and did not interfere with the interests of the
public. '
In Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Railway, etc., Co. e
al., in which leading counsel of the New York, as well as
the New Jersey Bar appeared, the same vice-chancellor
filed the opinion, which was concurred in by Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet, who also heard the case. Another stockholder of the Junction Company attacked, on the same
general grounds, a subsequent contract between the same
and additional parties, containing, inter alia, similar agreements, but expressly annulling the contract examined in
the Ellerinan case. The court refused to disturb its findings in the Ellerman case and against complainant's insistment that it was not competent, under the laws of New
Jersey, to organize a corporation, one of the objects of
which was to hold the stock of another corporation, it was
decided such a contention was an attack upon the original
incorporation of the company and could not be presented
to the court by a stockholder in an equity proceeding, but
only by the attorney-general on behalf of the state.
So thorough was the examination of the law and so able
were the opinions by the court, in these two cases, that
despite the very large interests involved and the eminence
of counsel engaged, neither case was appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The soundness of these decisions has never
been questioned.
Meredith v. Zinc aizd Iron Comnpany et al. was decided
in 1897. Stockholders sought to enjoin performance of a
contract entered into by rival mining companies, who had
been carrying on litigation against each other for some
time, to consolidate the various companies by sale and
transfer to one of them of the properties of the others for
cash and stock, take in other plants outside of New Jersey
and increase the capital stock of the company to pay for
such purchases. Some of the illegalities charged against
the contract were that it was in violation of the company's
charter, and of the original contract between the stock6
25o N. J. Eq. 65 , 892.

55 N. J. Equity, p. 221.
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holders, because it provided for purchase of wholesale interests in a large number of corporations, and would result
in the creation of a monopoly and thereby render complainant's stock and rights liable to forfeiture at suit of the
state. It was decid:d, by Vice-Chancellor Pitney, that
buying up by one corporation of the property of another
and consolidating the whole into one business, to the extent and in the manner provided in the agreement, was not
contrary to public policy, citing with approval the Ellerman and Willoughby cases. This case was taken to the
Court of Appeals and there affirmed on the opinion of the
vice-chancellor. It will be observed the contract passed
upon contained, so far as mentioned in the report, no
covenant in restraint of trade. The subject-matter was
such as to make it unnecessary, being mines and property
over which vendors could exercise no further control, after
sale. It was found, too, that the ore produced by all of
these mines was but a small fraction of that product
throughout the country.
A different situation was presented to the Chancery
Court in Attorney-General.et al. v. American Tobacco Co.
et al.,' also decided in x897. The defendant corporation
had been organized under the general act, in conformity
with an agreement, theretofore executed, between a number of compe' ing firms and companies engaged in making
and selling cigarettes, their combined business therein
amounting to 95 per cent. of such articles manufactured
and sold in the United States. The agreement provided
that all of the good-will, plants and property of the parties
should be taken over by the company for stock, in certain proportions, and that none of the officers, without
*the unanimous consent of the board of directors, should
engage in any similar business, etc. After the agreement
was carried out and the company organized accordingly, its
objects being, as set forth in its charter, to do a general
tobacco business, and to cure, manufacture, buy and sell
tobacco in all its forms, etc., the attorney-general, at the
relation of two individual competitors, and the two com-petitors themselves, as parties complainant, then filed
55 N-. J. Equity.
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the bill against the parties to the agreement and the company, attacking the incorporation of defendant as being
in fraud of the laws of the state, charging that the stock
issues were in violation of the corporation act, and
that the real purpose of incorporation, as evidenced by
the preliminary agreement between the corporators and
subsequent acts of the corporation, was to restrain jobbers
and others from selling any paper cigarettes except those
manufactured by the combination, and to prevent competition in such articles of commerce. The prayer -was for
decree that organization of defendant N'vas unlawful, and
that it had no power to use its corporate franchise to destroy competition in the business or to take over or carry
on the business of the firms and corporations interested, or
to injure or destroy business of competitors, and for injunction against parties to the agreement, restraining
them from using the corporate organization of the American Tobacco Company in the conduct of their business, or
in stifling competition in the business or in destroying or
injuring the business of complainants and other competitors. In the opinion by Reed, V. C., the bill was held
maintainable by the attorney-general, as the representative
of the people, to protect them from acts alleged to amount
to public injury, and by relators, as claiming to suffer special injury. It was said the bill directly challenged the existence of the corporation itself and that the law was settled in this state that a court of equity has no jurisdiction
to consider such a matter; that neither an illegal issuing of
the capital stock, nor the taking of any other defective
step in the process of its organization, nor even unlawful
intent in organizing, would make the corporate existence
of the company amenable to equitable cognizance; that if
the preliminary agreement was inimical to public policy, as
tending to create a monopoly or destroy competition and
control trade, yet it had been executed, and had ceased to
have any efficacy. It was suggested if the agreement was
bad, for the reasons advanced by complainants, it would
have been unenforceable in any court, and that it was possible such a contract might have been annulled before execution, on a bill then filed by the attorney-general. It was
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decided that the corporation had complied with the forms
of law, and was certainly a de facto, and apparently a de jure
corporation, and that as such it had power to manufacture
and sell cigarettes and carry on its business in accordance
with the powers named in its charter. On the subject of
the disposition of its goods by the corporation which was
sought to be enjoined, it was said that an individual manufacturer could sell his manufactured stock to whom he
pleased, or on any terms he pleased, and could refuse to sell
to any one with whom for his own reasons, however capricious, he did not care to deal; and that a corporation, acting within the powers granted it, was privileged to conduct its business in the same way. The court used this
language:
"The fact that a corporation is an entity, representing
an aggregation of skill and capital, does not curtail its
right to transact the business which the state's charter empowers it to conduct with exactly the same freedom as a
citizen. So long as by the policy of this state the formation of corporations is permitted, so long will the right of
such artificial persons to act within the scope of their franchises be in no sense different from the right of an individual. The control of a court of equity over the business
conduct of either is exactly the same. The contracts of
either will be rectified, annulled or specifically enforced,
and the duties of either as trustee or its right as cestui que
trust will be enforced and protected. Any illegal conduct
of either leading to irreparable injury will be enjoined. A
nuisance created by either will be restrained. Indeed,
whenever either an individual or corporation becomes related to any other individual or corjoration, so that equitable jurisdiction arises to remedy some wrong or secure
some righf, it matters not whether both parties are individuals or both corporations, or that one is natural and the
other an artificial person."
And it was finally concluded that a court of equity does
not possess authority to enjoin an act done by a corporation organized under the forms of law within the scope of
the powers conferred upon it by its charter merely because
of defects in the organization of the company, or because
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it was organized with a design of exercising its powers illegally. The acts of the corporation since its organization
were held to be legal, no illegal agreement made by it to
combine with any other corporation or person to fix or
establish a monopoly being presented to the court.
On -appeal from decree entered the Court of Appeals
affirmed on the opinon of the Court of Chancery.
The most recent case of large importance on the question of the power of corporations to prevent competition
by buying up control of rival concerns is Trenton Potteries
Company v. Oliphant,s decided in i899, on appeal. The
suit was on bill by the Trenton Potteries Company, to enforce contracts made- with the Oliphants, in which they
agreed not to carry on a competing business, sold to the
complainant corporation, Within certain limits of time and
space. It was said that contracts of that sort generally
declared enforceable were such as restrained trade, not
generally, but only partially, and no more extensively than
is reasonably required to protect the purchaser in the use
of the business purchased and not otherwise injurious to
public interests. Changed modern conditions were commented upon, as to whether or not the rule thus stated was
not too broad for modern conditions; but that question
was not decided, as it was held that the contracts before the
court were not in general, but only in partial restraint of
trade. But on the question of whether or not sanitary pottery ware was a necessity of life, and that the public might
therefore have such an interest in its manufacture and sale
that public policy would justify judicial interference and
refusal to enforce illegal combinations to enhance its price,
it was held that the facts did not show clearly that the public would suffer by the enforcement of the contracts; and
;t was further said that, while contracts restraining or limiting competition in the production of that ware might be
repugnant to public interest, such restraint or limit might
result from contrzicts which the courts are bound to enforce; and that a person engaged in any manufacture, having the right to acquire and possess property, might lawfully buy the business of any of his competitors, and that,
58 N. J. Equity, p. 507.
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in the absence of legislative restrictions (if such could be
imposed) upon the acquisition of such property and its use
when so acquired, the courts could impose no limitation;
they would be obliged to enforce such contracts, notwithstanding the effect would be to diminish or even to exclude
competition.
Passing on to whether a corporation was vested with
like powers, it was said that a corporation may lawfully do
any act within the corporate powers conferred on it by
legislative grant; that, under New Jersey corporation laws,
authority may be acquired by aggregations of individuals,
organized as prescribed, to engage in and carry on almost
every conceivable manufacture or trade; that such corporations might purchase and hold the stock of other companies, and that under such powers it was obvious that a
corporation might purchase the plant and business of competing individuals and concerns; that in the absence of
prohibition or limitation by the legislature of such corporate powers, it was impossible for the courts to pronounce acts done under legislative grant to be inimical to
public policy; that the grant of the legislature, authorizing
and permitting such acts, must fix for the courts the
character and limit of public policy in that regard, and that
it followed that a corporation empowered to carry on a
particular business might lawfully purchase the plant and
business of a competitor, although such purchase might
diminish or, for a time at least, destroy competition; and
that contracts for such purchase could not be refused enforcement. Such was the language of the Court of Appeals, speaking through the present chancellor, then the
chief justice.
Further discussion of these cases and of some federal
decisions affecting New Jersey corporations engaged in
interstate commerce will be carried on in another article.
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